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EVEN ALIENS ARE ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS:
EXTENDING MA THEWS v. ELDRIDGE BALANCING TO BOARD
OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PROCEDURAL REFORMS*
This Note argues that recent reforms to the Board ofImmigration Appeals must
conform to the constitutional due process requirements set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge. The Author applies the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to the reforms
and concludes that expanded single-member review, elimination of de novo factual
review, and reduction ofthe size of the Board meet the minimum constitutional due
process requirements. However, the Author also argues that two elements of the
proposed reforms, the Attorney General's discretion over which Board members
willsurvive the reduction in size, and time limitsfor Board Members 'decisionsfail
to withstand Matthews' due-process analysis. The Author concludes these reforms
should be eliminated to preserve the constitutionality ofthe reform package and the
long-term legitimacy of the Board as an appellate review body.
Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of
liberty.... Let it not be overlooked that due process oflaw is notfor the
sole benefit of an accused. It is the best insurancefor the Government
itself against those blunders which leave lasting stains on a system ofjustice ....
Justice Robert Jackson
INTRODUCTION
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is the primary appellate body for
reviewing immigration judges' orders to exclude or deport aliens from the United
States, and is the highest administrative tribunal that interprets the United States
immigration laws and regulations. 2 Attorney General John Ashcroft recently noted
that the BIA "has allowed the accumulation of a massive backlog of more than
56,000 pending cases"3 and that this "bottleneck in the immigration court system
* I would like to thank the William and Mary Bill ofRights Journal staff for their carefil
edits, and my family, especially Corie and Emily for their loving support, encouragement and
assistance.
1 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1953) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
2 Francesco Isgro, Attorney General Proposes Reorganization of the Board of
Immigration Appeals, MIGRATION WORLD MAGAZINE, Jan. 2002, at 35.
3 Id. at 34 (quoting comments made by Attorney General Ashcroft at a press conference
held on Feb. 6, 2002).
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gravely undermines the enforcement of our country's immigration laws." As a
result, Attorney General Ashcroft implemented an administrative Final Rule
reforming the BIA in an effort to improve efficiency.5
The Final Rule mandated major changes to BIA structure and procedure. First,
single board- member review replaced three-member review for all cases that do not
require interpretation of the law or the correction of clear errors of fact.6 Second,
a "clearly erroneous" standard of review replaced the "de novo" standard for the
factual review of immigration judges' findings.7 Third, the Final Rule established
a time limit of 90 days for single-member adjudications and a time limit of 180 days
for three-member adjudications.8 Fourth, the board was reduced in size from
twenty-three members to eleven members following a six-month transition period
to reduce backlog.9
In a press conference to introduce the Final Rule reforms, Attorney General
Ashcroft noted that "justice delayed is justice denied."'" The BIA reforms will most
likely hasten something. The question is: will it bejustice? The Department of
Justice contended that the Final Rule reforms will improve efficiency and remove
backlog by allocating more resources to cases that present difficult or controversial
legal questions and that require the BIA to issue precedent-setting decisions,
without adversely affecting the due process rights of aliens." Conversely,
opponents of the Final Rule claimed that the reforms will reduce the quality and
care of the BIA's decision-making process, will result in "rubber-stamping," and
will thereby threaten aliens' due process rights. 2
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the United States Supreme Court set forth a balancing
test to determine whether administrative procedures conform to procedural due
process laws.'3 In order to determine what process is due, the Court called for a
balancing of private interests, the probable value of additional safe guards, and the
government interest, including the cost ofthe procedure. '4 The Court noted that due
4 Id.
' Board ofimmigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67
Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3) [hereinafter Immigration
Procedural Reforms].
6 Id. at 54,880.
Id. at 54,880-81.
Id. at 54,895.
9 Id. at 54,881.
'0 Isgro, supra note 2, at 34 (quoting William Gladstone).
" ExEc. OFFICE OF IMMIGR. REvIEw, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: BOARD OF
IMMIGR. APPEALs: FINAL RULE (Aug. 23, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov /eoir/
press/02/BLARulefactsheet.pdf.
12 Emily Heller, Clash Over Plan for Immigrant Appeals, Critics: DOJ Plan a Due
Process Threat, 24 NAT'L L.J., Jul. 15, 2002, at Al.
" 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
14 Id. at 335.
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process is "flexible" and dependant upon attendant circumstances. 5 The
Department of Justice questioned whether the Mathews v. Eldridge test was
applicable to the Final Rule reforms, arguing that the BIA's status as an appellate
administrative agency gave the Attorney General the authority to determine what
process was due." The Attorney General also contended that most BIA decisions
do not weigh substantively on aliens' rights. 7
Section I of this note provides a brief history of the Board of Immigration
Appeals and introduces the Final Rule reforms. Section II discusses the historic
limits on aliens' constitutional due process rights, and argues that Mathews v.
Eldridge is the proper test for modern due process jurisprudence in the immigration
arena. Section II further posits that the Constitution, case law, and common sense
dictate that BIA reforms must conform to constitutional due process requirements.
Section III weighs the government's interest in efficient administration of BIA
appellate review against aliens' interests in fair adjudication of their cases, and
concludes that the interests of the two parties are evenly weighted in the majority
of cases under Mathews v. Eldridge. Section IV applies the final prong of the
Mathews balancing test to the Final Rule procedural reforms and concludes that
expanded single-member review, elimination of de novo factual review, and
reduction of the size of the Board meet the minimum constitutional due process
requirements. These reforms provide a flexible and reasonable system for balancing
aliens' rights to meaningful appellate review with the government's interest in
efficient and cost-effective resolution of immigration appeals. Two elements of the
proposed reforms, the Attorney General's discretion over which Board members
will survive the reduction in size, and time limits for Board members' decisions, fail
to withstand Mathews's due process analysis. These reforms threaten the political
independence of the Board and pressure Board members to decide cases hastily and
at the expense of accuracy and fairness. The Attorney General's control over Board
composition and time limits for Board decisions should be eliminated to preserve
the constitutionality of the reforms and the long-term legitimacy of the Board as an
appellate review body.
I. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
The BIA is the creation of Attorney General regulations and has never been
statutorily authorized.'" The Board traces its heritage to 1921 when the Secretary
"5 Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
16 Seelmmigration ProceduralReforms, supra note 5, at 54,881-82 (codified at 8 C.F.R.
pt.3).
17 Id.
18 1 CHARLES GORDON E7 AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.05, at 3-34
(2002). See Immigration and Naturalization Service, OrderNo. 3888,5 Fed. Reg. 2,454 (Jul.
1, 1940) (creating the Board of Immigration Appeals).
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of Labor created a board to assist in performing quasi-judicial functions under the
immigration and naturalization laws. 9 In 1940, the Attorney General officially
created the BIA, which for more than fifty years existed as part of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS), and consisted of only a chairman and four
members.2 The BIA separated from the INS in 1983 and became part of the
independent Executive Office of Immigration Review.2' Within the Executive
Office of Immigration Review, the BIA is under direct line of supervision by the
Attorney General and has authority to act on the Attorney General's behalf.22 Thus,
when the immigration laws confer a decision to the discretion of the Attorney
General, the BIA has authority to administer that discretion.23 The BIA has grown
rapidly over the last decade to twenty-three members and more than one hundred
staff attorneys in order to keep up with a heavy caseload and expanding functions.24
The BIA's primary responsibility is to consider appeals from decisions of
immigration judges in removal proceedings.25 Observers note that the BIA has
handled this responsibility with skill and expertise.26 The Board, however, has been
swamped with a burgeoning case load over the past few years. For example, in
fiscal year 1984, fewer than 3,000 new cases were filed with the BIA, while in
fiscal year 2000, nearly 30,000 new cases were filed.27 Attorney General John
Ashcroft indicated that backlog and inefficiencies mandated a reform to BIA
procedures:
The Board of Immigration Appeals needed a complete overhaul .... The
Board had become a bottleneck in the system, undermining the
enforcement of our country's immigration laws. Aliens' cases were in
limbo for years, and the Board did not provide effective guidance on
complex issues to the immigration judges, the Immigration and
19 GORDON, supra note 18, § 3.04, at 3-34.
21 Isgro, supra note 2, at 35.
21 GORDON, supra note 18, § 3.04, at 3-32 to 3-33.
22 GORDON, supra note 18, § 3.05, at 3-35.
23 Id. at 3-42 to 3-43.
24 Operations of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR): Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 27 (2002) (statement of Stephen Yale-Loher, American Immigration Lawyers
Association).
2 GORDON, supra note 18, at 3-35.
26 AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS'N, AILA'S FINALCOMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED BIA
REFORM RULE (Mar. 20, 2002) (posted on AILA InfoNet at Doc. No. 02032031), available
at http://www.aila.org/contentViewer.aspx?bc=9,576,598 (last visited Oct. 28, 2002)
[hereinafter AILA, FINAL COMMENT] ("The Board of Immigration Appeals has a long and
successful history of adjudicating a high volume of cases in a competent and efficient
manner.").
27 Id.
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Naturalization Service or the noncitizens. Such delays encouraged
unscrupulous lawyers to file frivolous appeals. Even though they could
not win, such lawyers could exploit the system to guarantee their clients
additional years within the United States.28
Thus, the Attorney General published a proposed rule on BIA reform in the Federal
Register on February 19, 2002, and solicited comments from interested parties.29
Despite numerous submissions from nongovernmental organizations opposing the
rule, the Department of Justice left the proposed rule almost entirely intact,
publishing the Final Rule on August 26, 2002.30 The Final Rule mandated four
major changes to BIA procedure: expanded single-member review, elimination of
de novo factual review for most cases, time limits for case adjudication, and
reduction of the Board in size from twenty-three to eleven members.' Opponents
fear the reforms will "tilt the balance in favor of expeditiousness, instead of
fostering careful and just adjudications, thereby impairing the due process rights of
individuals while undermining the Board's capacity to provide meaningful appellate
review."32 As the next section discusses, the Department of Justice has been too
quick to dismiss these due process concerns as inapplicable to the BIA.
I. IS THE BIA SUBJECT TO DUE PROCESS RESTRAINTS?
In material released with the Final Rule, the Department of Justice questioned
the applicability of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to the BIA reforms,
effectively arguing that the reforms were exempt from due process requirements.33
28 News Release, Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review,
Attorney General Issues Final Rule Reforming Board of Immigration Appeals Procedures
(Aug. 23, 2002), available at 2002 WL 1943761.
29 Proposed Rules, Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 7,309 (Feb. 19, 2002).
30 The Capital Area Immigrant's Rights Coalition and the American Immigration Lawyers
Association filed suit on October 25, 2002, in Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia, challenging that the Final Rule was implemented without "appropriate
consideration for the views of the interested public, including nongovernmental
organizations." American Immigration Lawyers Association, 6 WASHINGTON UPDATE No.
16 (Nov. 8, 2002) (posted on AILA InfoNet at Doc. No. 021108410, available at
http://www.aila.org/contentViewer.aspx?bc=-13,958 (last visited Mar. 24, 2003). The
Department of Justice contends that it complied with the thirty-day notice period required by
the Administrative Procedure Act. Immigration ProceduralReforms, supra note 5, at 54,879
(Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.3).
31 Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,880-81.
32 AILA, FINAL COMMENT, supra note 26.
33 See Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,882 ("[T]he Department
questions whether Mathews is the appropriate touchstone in light of the unique nature of the
act as the tool for managing the intersection of foreign and domestic interests regarding
aliens.").
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The Department of Justice argued that the majority of BIA appeals involve relief
from removal and, therefore, do not substantively implicate aliens' rights. 4 The
Department further contended that the due process clause does not confer a right to
appeal, even in criminal prosecutions, and therefore, any procedure employed by
the BIA, an appellate body, exceeds constitutionally required due process."
Finally, the Department argued that because the BIA is an administrative body
within the Department of Justice, it was "well within the Attorney General's
discretion to develop the management and procedural reforms provided in this
rule."36
The Department's arguments may be legalistically persuasive; however, they
ignore the nature of due process. Due process is the simple notion that the
Constitution requires governmental procedures to be fundamentally fair before a
person may be deprived of liberty or property.37 Most importantly, due process is
a "flexible" concept, dependant upon the attendant circumstances." Thus, some
circumstances require more stringent procedural safeguards than others. The
Department of Justice correctly argued that administrative burdens and weight of
constitutional rights in immigration proceedings are different from other
governmental proceedings. 39 Those differences, however, affect the type of
procedures that constitute due process, not the fact that the government owes due
process at all. Thus, the first step in assessing whether the BIA reforms impinge on
aliens' due process rights is to explore the nature and extent of the aliens' due
process rights. The second is to evaluate the impact BIA decisions have on those
rights. Ultimately, this section concludes that Mathews v. Eldridge due process
balancing applies to BIA procedures.
A. An Overview of Aliens' Due Process Rights in Immigration Proceedings
Courts have long held that aliens are entitled to due process protection in
immigration proceedings. 4" The extent of that due process protection, however, has
been extremely narrow.4' For example, in Yamataya v. Fisher, the Supreme Court
' Id. at 54,881-82.
" Id. at 54,881 (citing Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600,611 (1974) ("[W]hile no one would
agree that the State may simply dispense with the trial stage of proceedings without a
criminal defendant's consent, it is clear that the State need not provide any appeal at all.").
36 Id. at 54,883 (footnote omitted).
17 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... "); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
470 (1985) (stating that fundamental fairness is the touchstone of due process).
39 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471,481 (1972)).
39 Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,881-82.
40 See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903).
41 See id.
[Vol. 12:605
EVEN ALIENS ARE ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS
held that due process of law applied to a deportation hearing, and that an alien must
be given "all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be
and remain in the United States."'42 Nonetheless, the Court upheld the alien's
exclusion despite the fact that she had no formal hearing, could neither speak nor
understand English, and claimed that she was unaware she was being questioned
regarding deportation.'
Historically, the extent ofan alien's due process protection turned upon whether
the alien was classified as excludable or deportable." Until 1996, an alien already
physically present in the United States was subject to a deportation proceeding, and
an alien outside the United States seeking admission was subject to an exclusion
hearing.45 Aliens in exclusion proceedings were entitled to very little due process
protection, while aliens in deportation proceedings were entitled to substantially
higher protection.
1. Alien's Rights in Exclusion Proceedings: The Irony of Judicial Deference
Two cases, Knauffand Mezei, are enigmatic of the exclusion doctrine and the
extreme dearth of due process protection it provided. In Knauff (1950), the
Supreme Court held "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." In Mezei, the Supreme Court
affirmed Knauff, emphasizing that "it is not within the province of any court, unless
expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of
the Government." '4 Professor Charles Weisselberg has stated Knauff and Mezei
"represent the modem zenith of the plenary power doctrine in the Supreme Court.
In these decisions, the Court reinforced the notions that the Constitution stops at the
42 id.
43 THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL, IMMIGRATION AND CITZENSHIP: PROCESS
AND PouLcY 796 (4th ed. 1998).
SId. at 797.
4' Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21,25 (1982) ("The deportation hearing [was] the usual
means of proceeding against an alien already physically in the United States, and the
exclusion hearing [was] the usual means of proceeding against an alien outside the United
States seeking admission.").
Prior to 1996, aliens physically present in the United States were entitled to the
heightened due process protection of a deportation proceeding, irrespective of whether they
entered the United States legally. As a result, aliens who successfully entered the U.S.
illegally were entitled to greater due process protection than aliens who were seeking to enter
the U.S. legally. The 1996 Act shifted the line between inadmissible and deportable aliens;
aliens who enter United States illegally are now subject to a determination of inadmissibility
under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 16 C.F.R. § 212 (1996).
46 United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
41 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
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border and that the government has absolute and unreviewable authority in
exclusion matters.""
The underlying facts of Knauff and Mezei reveal the potentially harsh results
that the plenary power doctrine creates and the irony inherent in too much judicial
deference. Ellen Knauff, the petitioner in the Knauffcase, escaped Nazi Germany
and fled to England as a refugee." While in England, Ellen served honorably in the
Royal Air Force. 0 Later, she held a civil position with the U.S.War Department in
Germany, and married a naturalized U.S. citizen and veteran of World War 11.5I
When the Knauffs attempted to enter the United States in 1948, Ellen was detained
on Ellis Island and was permanently excluded without a trial on the grounds that
"her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States." 2
The Supreme Court upheld her exclusion, deferring to Congress's plenary
power in immigration affairs. 3 Justice Jackson, writing for the three-member
dissent stated, "I do not question the constitutional power of Congress to authorize
immigration authorities to turn back from our gates any alien or class of aliens. But
I do not find that Congress has authorized an abrupt and brutal exclusion of the wife
of an American citizen without a hearing." The popular media echoed Justice
Jackson's sentiment, calling for Ellen's release."5 Because of this publicity,
Congressjoined the campaign. Ellen testified before a congressional subcommittee
explaining that she had never received an exclusion hearing or officially been made
aware of the reasons for her exclusion.' The Senate and House both introduced
private bills calling for her release.5 7
The congressional and media attention, combined with her husband's visit to
the Attorney General, convinced Attorney General McGrath to reopen Ellen's
case.5 8 Ultimately, the BIA reversed Knauff s exclusion, holding that there was "no
substantial evidence" that she engaged in espionage or would pose a future threat
to the United States. 9 The BIA stated, "Uncorroborated hearsay ... does not
4' Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention ofAliens: Lessons from the
Lives ofEllen Knauffand Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 954 (1995).
'9 Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539.
50 Id.
51 id.
52 Id. at 539-40.
13 Id. at 544; see supra note 48, and accompanying text.
14 Id. at 550 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
" Weisselberg, supra note 48, at 958.
56 Id. at 959-60. The Justice Department opposed the bill and wrote a letter to Congress
affirming that the Attorney General was correct to exclude Knauff without a hearing. The
letter did not disclose any of the "confidential" reasons for Knauff's exclusion. Id.
17 Id. at 958.
58 Id. at 961.
I ld. at 963.
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amount to substantial evidence to support an exclusion decision." Charles
Weisselberg summarized the constitutional implications of the Knauff case: "The
rule of Knauff is that the Attorney General has the unchallengeable power to
exclude an alien. But the full story of Ellen Knauff shows a populace and a
Congress unwilling to accept the exercise of this sort of raw power."' Indeed,
Congress intervened to force the immigration authorities to grant Knauff minimum
due process in the form of a hearing. Weisselberg notes that the Knauffcase further
illustrates the value of due process in that "[o]nce the government was required to
justify its exclusion decision with substantial and reliable evidence, in an open
proceeding, Knauff gained admission into the United States." 2 Another lesson is
that the BIA, the body that was ultimately responsible for overturning Knauffs
exclusion, provides a review of immigration decisions that is critical to fair
adjudication of aliens' due process rights.63
The Mezei case further illustrates the extreme absence of due process protection
afforded under the plenary power doctrine. Ignatz Mezei was a legal permanent
resident who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years." In May of 1948,
he attempted to visit his dying mother in Romania.65 He was denied an entry permit
to Romania and spent nineteen months in Hungary due to "difficulty in securing an
exit permit." Upon attempting to return to the United States, he was temporarily
excluded because of passport difficulties. 67 After reviewing his case, the Attorney
General ordered that Mezei be permanently excluded without a hearing on the
"basis of information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which would be
prejudicial to the public interest."68 Critics feared that Mezei's exclusion would
amount to a life sentence on Ellis Island without a hearing.69 Mezei had applied for
admission to twelve Latin American countries, none of which were willing to accept
him, undoubtedly nervous about the information that the United States government
knew but was unwilling to disclose.7" The government responded that indefinite
detainment was not a necessary result of its stance, noting that Mezei was free to
leave Ellis Island despite not being able to enter the United States. Justice Jackson
60 Id. at 963-64. The Department of Justice's evidence against Knauff consisted of
"'gossip' that Knauff had previously furnished secrets to Czechoslovakian officials." Id. at
960.
61 Id. at 964.
62 Weisselberg, supra note 48, at 964.
63 See infra notes 111-25 and accompanying text.
6 Shaughnessy v. United States cc rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208 (1953).
65 id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See Weisselberg, supra note 48, at 983.
70 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 209.
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retorted, "[t]hat might mean freedom, if only [Mezei] were an amphibian!"'7' Like
Ellen Knauff, Ignatz Mezei was paroled into the United States due to media and
Congressional pressure,72 but not before he had spent over four years detained on
Ellis Island without a hearing."
Together, Knauff and Mezei illustrate a great irony in immigration law. The
Supreme Court, in deferring blindly to Congress's plenary power, abdicated its
"permanent and indispensable" duty of constitutional review.74 Ironically, in the
very cases in which the Supreme Court solidified this doctrine of extreme
deference, Congress ultimately intervened, passing private bills, to stop unjust and
merciless enforcement of the laws." If the Court had enforced reasonable
constitutional due process requirements from the outset, congressional intervention
would have been unnecessary.
2. Due Process in Deportation Hearings
Courts have required a higher standard of due process for aliens in deportation
proceedings. In Landon v. Plasencia, the Supreme Court noted, "once an alien
gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with
permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly. . . . [A]
continuously present resident alien is entitled to a fair hearing when threatened with
deportation."76 Essential elements to a fair hearing include the right to be informed
of rights and charges," the right to counsel at no cost to the government,7" the right
to a translator for aliens with little or no understanding of English,79 and the right
I' d. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
72 Weisselberg, supra note 48, at 970-71.
7 See id. at 984.
4 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958):
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.... [Marbury v. Madison] declared the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a
permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.
7 See supra notes 56-57, 72-73.
76 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (citation omitted).
7' Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding that an alien in
deportation proceedings was entitled to a hearing even before statute was passed creating the
right).
78 Handlovits v. Adcock, 80 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Mich. 1948) (holding that an immigrant
was not provided a fair deportation hearing where she did not understandingly waive her
right to representation by counsel or a friend).
9 Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994
(1982) (holding that an immigration judge abused his discretion in denying an alien
translation of the proceedings when a translator was present and willing to translate).
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to examine the evidence against an alien and opportunity to rebut, including the
right to cross-examine an adverse witness." The trial must be held before an
unbiased adjudicator who bases the decision solely on the record;8 the hearing must
take into account all evidence of record; and the adjudicator must articulate the
basis for the decision.82 Perhaps most importantly, the government must prove
deportability by clear and convincing evidence.83
3. Modem Due Process: Statutory Developments and the Introduction of
Mathews Balancing
The stark historical difference between deportation and exclusion has been
somewhat blurred by two significant developments. First, the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 199684 softens the distinction between
deportability and inadmissibility by making both groups of aliens subject to a single
removal proceeding under 8 U.S. Code § 1229a. Moreover, under § 1229a(b)(4),
all aliens, regardless of whether they are charged with deportation or exclusion, are
granted the right to counsel at no expense to the government, the right to examine
the evidence presented against them, and the right to have a record made of the
proceedings. 5 Other sections of the statutory scheme protect aliens' rights to notice
of charges, 6 notice of rights, 7 and the right to a fair trial before an unbiased
adjudicator. 8 The Code preserves the distinction between excludable and
deportable aliens, however, because under § 1229a, an alien is either charged with
exclusion under § 1182 or deportation under § 1227.9 The most important
distinction between the two sections is that under § 1182, an alien bears the burden
" See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2000) (requiring that alien be given a "reasonable
opportunity" to cross-examine government witnesses).
"I Perez v. INS, 643 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 983 (1982)
(vacating decision where BIA failed to indicate factors it considered in determining why
petitioner in removal proceeding failed to establish prima facia case of extreme hardship).
82 Id.
83 Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469,479 (1963) (holding that "deportation
is a drastic sanction, one which can destroy lives and disrupt families," and deportation on
ground of Communist Party Membership "must therefore be premised upon evidence of
'meaningful association').
' Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
SS 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2000).
8 U.S.C. § 1229 (1996) (requiring the INS to issue a notice to appear to initiate
removal proceedings).
87 Id.
88 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2000) ("The determination of the immigration judge shall
be based only on the evidence produced at the hearing.").
89 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (2000).
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of proving he is admissible, while under § 1227, the government must prove
deportability by clear and convincing evidence. 90
Second, while Mezei and Knauff are still good law, their potentially harsh
results have been somewhat tempered by a more recent Supreme Court decision.9'
In Landon v. Plasencia, the Court held that petitioner, a legal permanent resident
who briefly left the United States, was seeking admission and therefore subject to
exclusion proceedings.' Nonetheless, the Court determined that the entering alien
was entitled to due process protection of the laws and remanded the case to
determine whether the petitioner was afforded due process in the exclusion
proceeding.93
The Plasencia decision, standing alone, did not determine the contours of
aliens' rights in immigration proceedings. The Court did not overrule Mezei and
declined to determine "its scope," electing to distinguish Mezei on the ground of
length of absence - Plasencia had only left the United States for a few days, and
the government had conceded her right to due process, while Mezei had been absent
for approximately twenty months. 9 Nonetheless, the Plasencia Court explicitly
extended the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to immigration proceedings,
opening the door for due process balancing analysis.9" The Court restated the
Mathews v. Eldridge doctrine as follows:
In evaluating the procedures in any case, the courts must consider the
interest at stake for the individual, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of the interest through the procedures used as well as the probable value
of additional or different procedural safeguards, and the interest of the
government in using the current procedures rather than additional or
different procedures."
While this decision was a major victory for aliens' due process rights, substantial
hurdles remain.
o 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(2) & (3) (2000).
91 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 21-22 (1982) (holding that a legal permanent
resident was entitled to due process in exclusion proceedings under the Mathews v. Eldridge
balancing test).
92 Id. at 32.
93 Id. at 36-37.
" Id. at 33-34. Previous cases have made inroads on the plenary power doctrine.
Compare for example Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 460 (1963) (holding that "the
returning resident alien is entitled as a matter of due process to a hearing on the charges
underlying any attempt to exclude him"), with Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206,214-15 (1953) (holding that an alien who had left the country for some twenty
months was not entitled to due process in assessing his right to admission on his return).
9' Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34.
96 Id.
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Historically, courts have advanced two basic legal theories to justify tipping the
foregoing due process balancing analysis decidedly in favor of the government in
immigration proceedings." The first is that immigration proceedings, including
deportation and exclusion, are civil and do not require the provision of full criminal
procedural rights in order to protect aliens' interests. 98 Second, courts have justified
a lower standard of due process based on the view that immigration is of "political
character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review."' Under close
scrutiny, these arguments are not as compelling as they might initially seem.
Admittedly, immigration proceedings are not criminal in nature. " Immigration
proceedings, however, frequently result in physical detention, separation of friends
and family, and forfeiture of property and livelihood.' These punishments exceed
those typically imposed for civil violations. In Bridges v. Wixon, the Supreme
Court stated:
9' An excerpt from a 1913 opinion written by Justice Holmes illustrates these two
rationales:
It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of
aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful. The determination by facts
that might constitute a crime under local law is not a conviction of crime, nor is the
deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the Government to harbor
persons whom it does not want.
Bagajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
98 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952) (holding that "[dleportation is not a
criminal proceeding").
" Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101-02 n.21 (1976) (stating that "the
power over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial
review"). In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Supreme Court held:
[T]he power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international
relations, is vested in the political departments of the government, and is to be
regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive
authority according to the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial
department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the
paramount law of the Constitution, to intervene.
149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
100 See supra note 98.
101 Observers have commented that deportation is comparable to criminal punishment:
If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he has been invited as the
asylum most auspicious to his happiness - a country where he may have formed
the most tender connections; where he may have invested his entire property, and
acquired property of the real and permanent, as well as the movable and temporary
kind; where he enjoys, under the laws, a greater share of the blessings of personal
security, and personal liberty, than he can elsewhere hope for... if a banishment
of this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be
difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.
4 ELUIOT'S DEBATES 555 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. eds., 1881).
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Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a
great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and
live and work in this land of freedom. . . .That deportation is a
penalty... cannot be doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest
the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the
essential standards of fairness. 02
Furthermore, aliens are often at a stark procedural disadvantage in immigration
proceedings. The Supreme Court has noted that aliens are a "voteless class of
litigants who not only lack the influence of citizens, but who are strangers to the
laws and customs in which they find themselves involved and who often do not
even understand the tongue in which they are accused."'0 As a result, fundamental
fairness would dictate that immigrants receive more, not less, due process protection
than civil petitioners.
Courts further justify a lower standard of due process for aliens in immigration
proceedings based upon deference to Congress. In Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme
Court stated, "'over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress
more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens .... Our cases 'have long
recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign
attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from
judicial control.""' The judiciary has, in effect, abdicated its power of judicial
review and its role as the "supreme interpreter" of the Constitution.. by taking the
plenary power doctrine to such an extreme. Justice Murphy, in a concurring
opinion in Bridges v. Wixon, contended that deference to Congress at the expense
of constitutional liberty is inconsistent with constitutional democracy:
102 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (holding that the government failed to prove the petitioner
had an affiliation with the Communist Party).
103 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 46 (1950) (holding that administrative
hearings in deportation cases must conform to requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act).
104 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (citations omitted)). Justice Jackson noted the constitutional injustice
of providing less constitutional due process protection for aliens:
Our law may, and rightly does, place more restrictions on the alien than on the
citizen. But basic fairness in hearing procedures does not vary with the status of
the accused. If the procedures used to judge this alien are fair and just, no good
reason can be given why they should not be extended to simplify the
condemnation of citizens. If they would be unfair to citizens, we cannot defend
the fairness of them when applied to the more helpless and handicapped alien.
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 225 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
'05 Cooper v, Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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Since resident aliens have constitutional rights, it follows that Congress
may not ignore them in the exercise of its "plenary" power of
deportation.... [T]he First Amendment and other portions of the Bill of
Rights make no exception in favor of deportation laws or laws enacted
pursuant to a "plenary" power of the Government. Hence the very
provisions of the Constitution negative the proposition that Congress, in
the exercise of a "plenary" power, may override the rights of those who
are numbered among the beneficiaries of the Bill of Rights.
Any other conclusion would make our constitutional safeguards
transitory and discriminatory in nature. Thus the Government would be
precluded from enjoining or imprisoning an alien for exercising his
freedom of speech. But the Government at the same time would be free,
from a constitutional standpoint, to deport him for exercising that very
same freedom. The alien would be fully clothed with his constitutional
rights when defending himself in a court of law, but he would be
stripped of those rights when deportation officials encircle him. I cannot
agree that the framers of the Constitution meant to make such an empty
mockery of human freedom."°
Justice Murphy's opinion operates on the principle that while Congress and the
Executive should enjoy substantial authority to create and enforce immigration
laws, the Judiciary is charged under the Constitution with making the ultimate
determination as to whether the laws and actions are consistent with aliens'
constitutional rights.1 7
In performing this role as expositor of the Constitution,0o the Supreme Court
has typically struck the wrong balance in the immigration arena, affording too much
deference to Congress and the Executive and undervaluing aliens' interests in the
proceedings." Ultimately, aliens are entitled to fair, noncursory weighing of their
rights under the Mathews v. Eldridge framework."0 Such an analysis is the subject
of Sections I and TV of this note. First, however, we must address the Department
of Justice's argument that BIA decisions do not implicate aliens' due process rights.
106 326 U.S. 135, 161-62 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
.07 See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (holding that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution").
108 See id.
'09 See Hirsoshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COIuM. L. REV. 1625, 1626 (1992)
(discussing the "stunted growth of constitutional immigration law" due to Supreme Court
deference to Congress).
"0 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982); infra notes 130-48.
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B. Impact of BIA Decisions on Aliens'Due Process Rights
The Department of Justice contends that the substantive rights of aliens are not
implicated in BIA review, largely due to the fact that the BIA is an appellate
administrative body, and cases only reach the BIA after an immigration judge has
already determined that an alien is removable."' Indeed, most cases before the BIA
involve an alien's eligibility to apply for relief from a removal order or whether the
Attorney General should exercise discretion in the respondent's favor."2 The
Department contends that the process due under the Constitution in determining
whether to grant relief from an order of removal is substantially lower than the
process required in determining whether an alien is removable." 3
1. The BIA Impacts Substantive Rights
The Department's argument is overly legalistic and downplays the importance
of the BIA. The American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) noted:
The importance of the work of the members of the BIA must not be
underestimated. Board Members often make decisions that will
determine whether someone who has been persecuted and tortured will
live or die, whether a U.S. family will be divided, or whether a
permanent resident who has lived here for decades will be returned to a
country where he/she has no ties. Board Members have to make these
decisions in a dynamic framework, oftentimes against a backdrop of
uneducated, unrepresented, frequently traumatized foreign nationals,
poor quality transcripts, and ill-trained [immigration judges]. Country
and political conditions also frequently change, further affecting the
decisions that Board Members must make." 4
Jeanne Butterfield, Executive Director of the AILA added "[t]he BIA often is the
court of last resort for the vast majority of people seeking review of decisions by
immigration judges." '" BIA decisions directly and substantively impact aliens'
rights to life, liberty, and property. Thus, it is "vitally important that the BIA
remain a robust and vigorous review body."' 6
" See Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,881-82.
Il2 ld. at 54,882.
113 id.
114 AILA, FINAL COMMENT, supra note 26.115 Press Release, American Immigration Lawyers Association, Ashcroft Changes to BIA:
A Slap in the Face to Immigrants (2002), available at http://www.aila.org/contentViewer.
aspx?be=79,594,1003,1578 (last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
116 Id.
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2. The BIA's Process Must Be Fair to Ensure Aliens Receive a Fair Trial under
the Immigration Laws
The Department of Justice argues that the BIA owes a lower standard of due
process in administering relief from removal and discretionary relief cases." 7 In
reality, BIA oversight of discretionary relief is critical to a fair hearing due to
inflexible and overly harsh immigration laws and common errors at the trial level.
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (ITRAIRA) in an effort to control illegal immigration and counter
terrorism. "' Unfortunately, IIRAIRA has led to substantial violations of aliens' due
process rights, as the immigration bar indicates:
Under the 1996 laws, legal immigrants routinely are detained without
bond, deported without consideration for discretionary relief, restricted
in their access to counsel, and barred from appealing to the courts. The
laws expand the grounds of deportation, subjecting long-term
immigrants to mandatory detention and automatic deportation for
relatively insignificant crimes. Low-level immigration officials act as
judge and jury, and the federal courts have been denied the power to
review most deportation decisions and INS activities. Moreover, these
laws are being applied retroactively. As a result, many immigrants have
been expelled from their adoptive country for one-time offenses and
youthful indiscretions that occurred, in some cases, many years ago. The
1996 laws are merciless: providing for no second chances, changing the
rules in the middle of the game, and denying people their day in court.
The 1996 immigration laws are tearing families apart... .!9
While BIA review cannot cure all of the ills inherent in ITRAIRA, it does
provide a critical second chance for aliens to have their cases heard and their
petitions for relief from removal reconsidered. The BIA's review function is
especially important given the inflexibility of IRARIA. IRARIA obligates
immigration judges to issue orders of removal in very specific circumstances,
without regard to mitigating factors such as the length of time the person has lived
'1 See Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,882.I18 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
119 AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS'N, RESTORE FAIRNESS AND DuE PROCESS: 1996
IMMIGRATION LAWS Go Too FAR, (May 30, 2002), available at http://www.aila.org/
contentViewer.aspxbc=10,911,722,838 (posted on AILA InfoNet at Doc. No. 2 IP1002)
(last visited Mar. 4, 2003) [hereinafter AILA, Restore Fairness and Due Process].
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in the United States, or evidence of rehabilitation, that might excuse the alien. 2 °
According to the AILA, IIRARIA robs immigration judges of the "authority to
consider all the facts of a case before making a decision to deport a legal
resident"'' and the "discretion to grant relief in deserving cases."'22 A grant of
relief from removal allows aliens who are technically removable under the laws, but
whose removal would result in an injustice, to remain in the United States. Given
the inflexible nature of the immigration laws, relief from removal is critical to
ensure that an alien receives justice.
The Department of Justice's argument that the BIA does not have to conform
to due process protections is disingenuous. The Department can best protect the
ideals and image of American democracy by adhering to notions of due process.
As Justice Jackson noted more than a half-century ago, "due process of law is not
for the sole benefit of an accused. It is the best insurance for the Government itself
against those blunders which leave lasting stains on a system of justice .... 123
Perhaps the Department could learn from Justice Vinson, who noted that "power is
never without responsibility." 24 Certainly, the BIA is endowed with great power
to administer the immigration laws of this country, and with that power comes the
responsibility to administer them fairly - fundamental fairness is the touchstone
of due process.' 25 Given the current power and authority of the BIA, including its
authority to oversee discretionary relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act,
its procedures must be fair under the Mathews balancing test if aliens are to receive
due process at the hands of the American justice system.
I1. WEIGHING THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN EFFICIENT BIA PROCEDURES
VERSUS ALIENS' INTEREST IN A FAIR HEARING BEFORE THE BIA UNDER
MA THEWS v. ELDRIDGE
In commenting on the Final Rule procedural reforms, the Department of Justice
claimed that "[tihe interest of the government in effective and efficient adjudication
of immigration matters... is substantially higher than an individual respondent's
interest in his or her own proceeding." 26 The Plasencia holding, however, stands
for the general proposition that an alien's interest in immigration proceedings is not
120 id.
121 Id.
12 Id.
'23 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1953) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
12 Am. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950) (holding that labor
unions endowed with government-like powers are under a duty to exercise their powers in
good faith).
"2 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
126 Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,882.
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categorically overborne by the weight of the government's interest.'27 Indeed, an
alien's interest in fair procedures before the BIA is roughly equal to the
government's interest.
The Department of Justice bases its contention that its interests trump aliens'
interests on the fact that Congress enjoys plenary power under the Constitution to
administer the immigration laws. 28  This authority, the Department notes,
"implicates... the vast external realm of foreign relations"'2 9 and, as such, "the
Attorney General has substantially more authority to structure the administrative
adjudicatory process than most administrative processes."' 30  Indeed, the
Department questions "whether Mathews is the appropriate touchstone in light of
the unique nature of the [Immigration] Act as the tool for managing the intersection
of foreign and domestic interests regarding aliens."''
The Department's assertions are based on an exaggeration of its interests and
authority. The "vast external realm of foreign relations"' 2 is certainly important
and weighty. The Department, however, makes no effort to quantify the extent to
which BIA procedures implicate those interests. Would the maintenance of the BIA
status quo have upset the U.S. balance of power, harmed relationships with foreign
allies, orjeopardized U.S. security? The Department does not assert that it will, nor
does it assert that the reforms will positively impact U.S. foreign policy.
Essentially, the Department claims that because it might have a substantial foreign
policy interest in any given case, its interest should be weighed as if it had a
substantial interest in every single case. Such a proposition stands in stark contrast
with the idea that due process is "flexible" and dependant upon the attendant
circumstances.'33
Furthermore, the Plasencia holding contradicts the Department's assertion that
implication of foreign relations authority places its procedures outside the scope of
the judicial review under the Mathews balancing test. In Plasencia, the Supreme
Court specifically noted that "control over matters of immigration is a sovereign
prerogative, largely within the control of the Executive and the Legislature.' ' 4
127 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (holding that returning alien seeking
admission was entitled to due process and remanding the case to determine whether
procedures used met the due process requirement); see also infra notes 134-40 and
accompanying text.
128 Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,882.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. (citations omitted).
132 Id.
133 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) ("The constitutional sufficiency of
procedures provided in any situtation, of course, varies with the circumstances.").
134 Id.
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Nonetheless, the Court applied the Mathews test to an exclusionary proceeding,'
an area where Congress and the Department have been afforded the greatest degree
of deference.'3 6 The Supreme Court weighed the government's interests against
aliens' interests within the Mathews v. Eldridge framework. The Court found that
"[t]he Government's interest in efficient administration of the immigration laws"'37
and sovereign prerogative in the immigration arena "must weigh heavily in the
balance."' On the other side of the balance, the Court found that aliens have
"weighty" and high-ranking rights to "stay and live and work in this land of
freedom" and "to rejoin . . . immediate family."'39 The Plasencia Court then
remanded the case for a determination of whether the specific procedures used
violated Plasencia's rights."4 Remand for a consideration of the procedures
employed would have been unnecessary if the Court had determined that the
government's interest "substantially outweighed" the alien's rights.
The Department of Justice has a weighty interest in the efficient and effective
administration of the BIA, and the Executive is entitled to substantial judicial
deference. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's balancing analysis in Plasencia
indicates that aliens have compelling interests at stake in immigration proceedings.
Those interests at least off-set the government's interest in efficient BIA
procedures. Thus, an inquiry into the specific BIA Final Rule procedures is
necessary.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL RULE REFORM PROCEDURES
The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test requires analysis into whether the BIA
reform procedures increase "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the [alien's]
interest"'' 4' weighed against the government's interest "in using the current
procedures rather than additional or different procedures."'42 The analysis also
requires consideration of the "probable value of additional or different procedural
safeguards."' 43
131 Id. at 37 (remanding to determine whether Plasencia was accorded due process under
the Mathews balancing test).
136 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34.
139 Id.
139 Id.
", Id. at 37 (recognizing the "gravity of Plasencia's interest" and remanding the case for
a determination of"the other factors relevant to due process analysis - the risk of erroneous
deprivation, the efficacy of additional procedural safeguards, and the Government's interest
in providing no frther procedures").
141 Id. at 34.
142 id.
143 Id.
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Opponents of the Final Rule reforms contend that the reforms fail the Mathews
test by "significantly increasing the risk of erroneous deprivation of private
interests, while doing little to decrease the government's fiscal and administrative
burdens."'" However, application of this final prong of the Mathews test to the
generality of BIA cases 145 reveals that expanded single-member review, elimination
of de novo factual review, and reduction of the size of the Board are constitutional.
These measures will substantially decrease the government's burden while
protecting aliens' interests in fair procedures before the BIA. Conversely, the
imposition of time limits for case adjudication and the ability of the Attorney
General to determine at his discretion which Board members will remain and which
will be removed violate due process. These measures will increase the risk of
erroneous deprivation of aliens' rights without any off-setting benefit in efficiency
or cost savings. Indeed, these reforms threaten the viability of the entire reform
system, undermine the legitimacy of the BIA as an appellate body, and should be
eliminated from the BIA procedural reforms.
A. Expanded Single-Member Review under the Case Management System
At the heart of the Final Rule reforms is expanded single-member review under
the Case Management System. As the following paragraphs highlight, the system
effectively balances government and aliens' interests in the great majority of cases
by providing varying levels of review, depending on the demands of the case.
Tracing a case through the steps of the Case Management System will allow us to
explore how it works.
Under the Case Management System, an appeal to the BIA comes first to a
screening panel consisting of BIA board members.'" Individual members of the
screening panel are authorized to summarily dismiss an appeal at the screening
stage if the case does not merit appellate review. 4 Members ofthe screening panel
may find that a case does not merit appellate review if: A) the appellant fails to
specify reason for the appeal on the proper form; B) the appellant previously
'4 AILA, FINAL COMMENT, supra note 26.
14' The Matthew's Court emphasized that "procedural due process rules are shaped by the
risk of error inherent in the truth finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the
rare exceptions." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,344 (1976). The majority of BIA cases
consist of alien appellants seeking relief from orders of removal. See GORDON, supra note
18. As discussed previously, relief from removal is often an alien's only hope to avoid unfair
and overly harsh application of inflexible immigration laws. See supra notes 118-22 and
accompanying text. As such, appellants seeking relief from removal merit substantial due
process protection. See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
"" See Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,903 (codified at 8 C.F.R
§ 3. 1(e)(1)).
147 Id.
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conceded the factual finding or conclusion of law on which the appeal is based; C)
the appellant was already granted the relief he requests; D) the Board concludes that
the appeal was filed under an improper motive or lacks an arguable basis in fact or
law; E) the appellant fails to file supporting documents that he states he will file;
F) the appeal falls outside the Board's jurisdiction; G) the appeal is untimely or
barred by an affirmative waiver of the right to appeal; or H) the appeal is barred by
statute or regulation.'" The summary dismissal procedure will increase efficiency
by allowing the Board to devote fewer resources to meritless claims, and to dismiss
those claims at an early stage.
If an appeal survives summary judgment, the member of the screening panel
assigns the case to a single board member for adjudication, unless the case is
eligible for three-member panel review." 9 The screening panel may assign a case
to a three-member panel only if the case presents one of the following
circumstances:
(i) The need to settle inconsistencies among the rulings of different
immigration judges;
(ii) The need to establish a precedent construing the meaning of laws,
regulations, or procedures;
(iii) The need to review a decision by an immigration judge or the
Service that is not in conformity with the law or with applicable
precedents;
(iv) The need to resolve a case or controversy of major national import;
(v) The need to review a clearly erroneous factual determination by an
immigration judge; or
(vi) The need to reverse the decision of an immigration judge or the
Service, other than a reversal under § 3. l(e)(5)."
Opponents of the Final Rule argue that this screening procedure will "place
enormous, and potentially unreviewable discretion in the hands of individual Board
Members""' and that case assignment decisions are likely to be inconsistent with
those of other Board members."s2 As a result, opponents predict that appeals to the
148 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2) (2002).
149 See Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,903 (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 3. 1(e)(3)).
ISo Id. (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (e)(6)). Under section 3.1 (e)(5), a single board member
is entitled to reverse "if such reversal is plainly consistent with and required by intervening
Board or judicial precedent, by an intervening Act of Congress, or by an intervening final
regulation." Id. (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(5)).
151 AILA, FINAL COMMENT, supra note 26.
152 Id.
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federal courts and subsequent remands to the BIA will erase any gains in efficiency
from single-member review.
53
The success of the Case Management System hinges on the ability of screening
personnel to consistently and fairly assign cases to the proper review panel.
Screening panel members may commit mistakes in assigning individual cases to the
wrong type of review panel. For the majority of cases, however, individual Board
members are capable of accurately, consistently, and fairly assigning cases to the
proper panel under the standards outlined above." The Department notes that the
criteria used to assign appeals are similar to those federal appellate courts utilize in
"deciding whether to hold oral argument or to publish an opinion."155 Furthermore,
the standards outlined in section 3.1 (e)(6) are fair and cover the types of cases that
merit additional due process protection. If a screening panel member incorrectly
judges a case to warrant the lower single-member protection, the Board member to
whom the case is assigned can later refer it to a three-member panel. " This extra
safeguard protects against inconsistencies in decision making among screening
panel members by providing a second level of review. Ultimately, if an alien is not
satisfied that his case was considered by the proper body, he may move to reopen
the case or appeal to federal district court. 1 7
If an appeal passes the screening panel and is assigned to a single Board
member, the reviewing Board member may take any of three actions, depending on
the merits of the case. First, the Board member may affirm the decision without
opinion, provided that the decision was correct, and provided that any errors were
harmless and immaterial." 8 Also, the issues on appeal must be "squarely controlled
by existing Board or federal court precedent and do not involve the application of
precedent to a novel factual situation; or ... [t]he factual and legal issues raised on
appeal are not so substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a written opinion
in the case.""' 9 This procedure protects the rights of aliens by allowing summary
153 Id.
'4 See Immigration ProceduralReforms, supra note 5, at 54,888. The Departmentnoted:
The criteria used in the final rule are similar to those used by the federal courts
of appeals in deciding whether to hold oral argument or to publish an opinion.
The Department believes that these criteria strike the proper balance between
cases that do not present novel or complicated issues that may be decided by a
single Board member, and those issues that are appropriate for review by a three-
member panel.
Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. (codified at § 3.1(e)(3)).
157 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (2002).
'.. See Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,903 (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 3. l(e)(4)).
159 Id.
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affirmance "only if the Board member finds that the record is complete and legally
adequate, and the Board member agrees that the decision below is legally
correct .... ,160
This same summary affirmance procedure proved to be effective at efficiently
resolving cases under an earlier reform called the streamlining initiative. 61 The
Board applied the streamlining initiative in reaching approximately one-half of its
decisions in fiscal year 2001 .162 A report on the initiative indicated that "between
1999 and 2001, only 0.7% [of the summary decisions] have resulted in judicial
remands or reversals"'6 and persons involved felt that the quality of BIA decisions
improved.'"'
If an alien's appeal is not fit for affirmance without opinion, the reviewing
Board member may issue a written opinion or, if the requirements listed above for
three-member panel review are met, submit the case to panel review. I15 Assuming
that the case qualifies for three-member panel review, the panel may, at its
discretion, elect to hear oral argument either before the three-member panel, or
before the entire Board sitting en banc.1" No oral argument is permitted before
single Board members.167
The Case Management System promises to improve the efficiency of the BIA
by allocating more resources to cases that merit them. Appeals are appropriately
screened for procedural accuracy before they proceed to merit review. Cases that
are clearly controlled by existing law and precedent will be decided by a single
Board member while cases that require extension of the law, or application of the
law to new facts, will be reviewed by three-member panels. Critics of the Case
Management System necessarily assume that individual Board members are either
incapable or unwilling to fairly review cases. This assumption is unfair, absent any
supporting evidence. Indeed, evidence on the success of the streamlining initiative
suggests that individual Board members are capable of making accurate and fair
'6 Id. at 54,885.
161 Id. (citing Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals:
Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135, 56,137 (Oct. 18, 1999)). The streamlining initiative
allowed a single board member to affirm a case without opinion in cases when "the result
reached [below] ... was correct ... any errors in the decision under review were harmless
or nonmaterial; and... either ... the issue on appeal was squarely controlled by existing
Board or federal court precedent... or. . . the factual and legal questions raised... were
so insubstantial that three-member review was not warranted." id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 id.
165 immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,903 (codified at 8 C.F.R. §
3.1(e)(5).
'6 Id. (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(7)).
167 id.
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decisions on appeals. 1 Fundamental to the Case Management System is the fact
that every appeal will be considered by at least one individual who regards it as
their duty to fairly, completely, and accurately decide appeals. Thus, the Case
Management System effectively balances the government's and the aliens' interests,
and thereby satisfies the Mathews balancing test.
B. Elimination of de novo Factual Review
Historically, the BIA has had the power to review the factual findings of
immigration judges de novo.169 Under the reforms, the BIA reviews issues of fact
under a clearly erroneous standard.' The AILA contends that elimination of de
novo review will result in "cursory review of matters that often rise or fall on the
particular facts of a given case..'' The AILA also notes that despite recording
requirements, immigration judges often issue their decisions orally following a
hearing, relying only on their notes or memory; as a result of this practice and the
inherent difficulty in gathering facts, the immigration judge's decisions often
contain factual errors.'72 Factual inaccuracies are unarguably cause for concern and
may necessitate reforms at the trial level. The BIA, however, is an appellate body,
and as such, should not be primarily responsible for fact finding. Indeed, the
purpose of standards of review is to preserve the distinct roles of trial and appellate
courts. 173 The Department of Justice noted that the Final Rule focuses "on the
primacy of immigration judges as factfmders and determiners of the cases before
them.""74 The Department emphasized that the Board's role is "not to serve as a
second-trier of fact,"'75 rather, it is "to identify clear errors of fact or errors of law
in decisions under review, to provide guidance and direction to the immigration
judges, and to issue precedential interpretations as an appellate body."' 76
168 See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
"' Matter of B-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 1955) (holding that BIA is entitled to de novo
review of factual conclusions of special inquiry officer); Matter of Vilanova-Gonzales, 13
1. & N. Dec. 399, 402 (B.I.A. 1969).
170 See Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,902 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 3.1(d)(3)) (noting that the Board may continue to conduct a de novo review of decisions
of service officers and questions of law, discretion, judgment, and all other issues on appeal
from immigration judges).
'"' AILA, FINAL COMMENT, supra note 26.
172 Id.
17' Richard H. W. Maloy, "Standards ofReview"-Just a Tip of the Icicle, 77 U. DET.
MERCY L. REv. 603, 609 (2000).
'74 Sweeping Changes in Storefor BIA, 79 INTERIR ERRELEASES NO. 35, 1346, 1348
(2002).
175 Id.
176 Id.
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Clear division of fact-finding authority will promote efficiency by avoiding
duplicative work. The Supreme Court noted that requiring an appellate body to
duplicate the fact-gathering efforts of a trial court "would very likely contribute
only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of
judicial resources.""' The elimination of de novo review promotes the
government's interest in due process by allowing the BIA to forgo a costly
procedure that only negligibly improves the accuracy of the hearing.7 8 The rights
of aliens are protected because the reform permits Board members to review factual
determinations when they have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed." 9 Additionally, the Board may continue to conduct a de novo
review of decisions by INS officers, questions of law, discretion, judgment, and all
other issues on appeal from immigration judges. "0
Opponents of the reform argue that gains in BIA efficiency from the higher
standard of review will be frustrated due to dramatic increases in remands.' 8' A
short period of remands, however, may actually improve the quality of immigration
judges' decisions and improve efficiency in the long run. The BIA remanded a case
for insufficient factual findings shortly following the issuance of the Final Rule, but
before the effective date of the reforms.' 2 The BIA opinion noted: "[miost
Immigration Judges presently issue comprehensive and thorough decisions, which
are adequate under the present regulations and which should suffice under the
newly promulgated rules."' The BIA carefully emphasized, however, that the
Final Rule "adds meaningful force to an Immigration Judge's decision and
heightens the need for Immigration Judges to include clear and complete findings
of fact in their decisions."'' 9
7 Anderson v. City ofBessemer, 470 U.S. 564,575 (1985) (holding that lower court out-
stepped the bounds of clearly erroneous review by taking the findings of fact and considering
them de novo when the court was convinced it would have decided the cases differently). The
Court also noted that requiring parties to prove their case factually at two levels is "requiring
too much." Id.; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) (stating that "clearly
erroneous" standard of review recognizes that an evidentiary hearing on the merits should
be the "'main event' ... rather than a 'tryout on the road').
" See Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,889-90.
179 Id.; see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,395 (1948) ("A
finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.").
18o See Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,890.
181 See AILA, FINAL COMMENT, supra note 26.
182 See In re S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 462, 466 (B.I.A. 2002) (remanding the case for
insufficient factual findings to determine whether the immigration judge correctly considered
INS opposition in granting relief from removal).
183 Id. at 465.
184 Id.
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The BIA's decision places Immigration Judges on notice that their cases will
be remanded for insufficient factual findings. Censure by remand will likely
encourage immigration judges to put more effort into fact finding at the trial level.
Improved fact finding at the trial level will increase efficiency and due process
protection for aliens. The burden of accurate fact finding is more appropriately and
efficiently placed at the trial level. Trial courts are better equipped to make factual
determinations, particularly concerning credibility of witnesses, because witnesses
appear in person before them."8 5
Ultimately, implementing a standard of clearly erroneous review brings the BIA
into accord with other types of appellate courts. As the Supreme Court noted, de
novo factual review at the appellate level results in huge costs in government
resources without substantially improving the protection of aliens' rights.'" As a
result, the elimination of BIA de novo review satisfies Mathews' due process
analysis.
C. Reduction in Size of Board
The Final Rule mandates a reduction of the Board's size from twenty-three
members to eleven members, following a transition period to reduce backlog.' At
first glance, it is difficult to understand how halving the already overburdened
Board will promote efficiency and timely resolution of cases. Critics of the
reduction in size note: "[I]t is disingenuous to expect the Board to maintain the
quality of its adjudications and increase its productivity in the face ofhandicapping
reductions in resources."'88 This criticism ignores the experience of the federal
courts that having too many judges impedes efficient operation of courts. 9 Judge
Irving Kaufman, former chief judge of the Second Circuit, noted:
"' See In re A-S-, 211. & N. Dec. 1106 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding that the Board, despite
having the authority to review cases de novo, "accords deference to an Immigration Judge's
findings concerning credibility and credibility-related issues").
'86 See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985); supra note 177 and
accompanying text.
187 See Immigration ProceduralReforms, supra note 5, at 54,893. Under the reforms, the
Board will likely divide cases among five Board members acting individually and two three-
member panels. Id. The Department based its decision to reduce the size of the Board and
allocate decisions in this manner on "judgments made about the historic capacity of appellate
courts and administrative appellate bodies to adjudicate the law in a cohesive manner, the
ability of individuals to reach consensus on legal issues, and the requirements of the existing
and projected caseload." Id.
188 AILA, FINAL COMMENT, supra note 26.
189 See Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice: The Case Against Expansion of
the Federal Judiciary, 79 A.B.A. J. 70, 71 (1993) (citing the conclusion of the Federal
Courts Study Committee that "advocated a cap of 1,000 Article II judges to 'enable the
federal courts to maintain their high quality, cohesiveness[,] and effectiveness"').
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[C]oherence and uniformity of the law are bound to decline with
addition of new judges. Such instability can have a snowball effect.
The judicial workload is increased because more panel hearings and en
banc votes are required. And the uncertainty of outcomes resulting from
a cacophony of differing opinions can act as a catalyst for new appeals
as more litigants find a roll of the appellate dice worth the chance. 90
A decrease in Board members will likely promote collegiality and cohesiveness
among Board members, increase the clarity and consistency of decisions, and,
thereby, improve the efficiency of the Board. As a result, both the aliens' and the
government's due process interests will be better served.'
A troubling element of the plan to reduce the size of the Board is the fact that
the Attorney General will decide at his discretion which Board members will be
removed. 92 This move has drawn staunch criticism from observers who argue that
the reduction exposes the Attorney General's true motives behind the reform: to
solidify his control over the Board and its decisions.'93 Jeanne Butterfield,
Executive Director of the AILA, called this element of the reform a "thinly veiled
political threat," because the unfettered discretion will allow the Attorney General
to remove judges who are inconsistent with his political philosophy.194
"Equally troubling," the AILA warns, "is the potential impact of these future
dismissals on the independent decision-making of all BIA Members during the six
to nine month transition period."'195 Opponents note that Attorney General Ashcroft
will consider productivity "broadly, the number of rulings each board member
makes" as "one of the factors.., in determining who stays on the board."' 96 Thus,
Board members may feel pressure to decide cases quickly to keep up with the Board
member sitting next to them. The Attorney General has created a system where
incentive for Board Members to act quickly (to preserve their jobs) is at odds with
thorough, fair, and accurate work. Indeed, this perverse system of incentives may
already be affecting the Board. Observers have commented that the mood at the
Board is "somber" and noted that three Board members have recently resigned.' 97
190 1d.
g' See Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,893.
192 See id.
,13 See AILA, FINAL COMMENT, supra note 26.
'" Lisa Getter & Jonathan Peterson, Speedier Rate ofDeportation Rulings Assailed, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 5,2003, available athttp://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/la-na-imig5jan
05001500.story (last visited Jan. 6, 2003).
195 AILA, FINAL COMMENT, supra note 26.
"9 Getter & Peterson, supra note 194.
197 id.
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Allowing the Attorney General to have complete discretion in deciding which
Board members will be removed calls into question the political independence and
integrity of the Board and places immense pressure on Board members to decide
cases hastily. This incentive system is inconsistent with due process because it
limits the ability of the adjudicator to be fair.
D. Time Limits
The least defensible of the Final Rule reforms is the imposition of time limits
for case adjudication. The Final Rule mandates that for normal cases, a single
board member must complete review of the case within ninety days of completion
of the record on appeal.'" Cases assigned to three-member panels must be
completed within 180 days of completion of the record on appeal.'" These time
limits fail the Mathews balancing test by substantially increasing the risk that aliens'
interests will be erroneously deprived without providing an off-setting benefit in
government efficiency. Furthermore, the time limits threaten the viability of the
entire BIA reform, and may ultimately undermine the existence of the BIA itself by
forcing Board members to rubber-stamp decisions without careful consideration.
The Department contends that the time limits provide sufficient time for the
Board to rule on the "vast majority of cases," and notes that a procedure exists for
extending time limits in the rare cases that it is necessary.3°° The Department
ignores the fact that even if a time limit is "sufficiently long to permit an unhurried
decision in any given case,"' it may be "applicable to so many cases that a judge
will be forced to devote less time to some of them than she otherwise would ...
A 1997 article on the constitutionality of statutorily-imposed time limits on federal
judges concluded that "time limits... can unduly interfere with courts' inherent
decisionmaking function by requiring judges in some instances to devote less time
to cases than they otherwise would, thereby increasing the risk of arbitrary
decisions."2 o3
Indeed, Professor Alexander Aleinikoff, former INS General Counsel, indicated
that time limits are already pressuring Board members to decide cases hastily at the
expense of accuracy and fairness: "We are already seeing results: [m]any, many
cases are decided at a speed that makes it impossible to believe they got the scrutiny
'98 See Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,903 (codified at 8 C.F.R. §
3. 1(e)(8)).
199 See id.
200 Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,896.
'01 William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on
Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REv. 761, 801 (1997).
202 id.
203 Id. at 765.
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a person who faces removal from the United States deserves."2°4 As a result, more
aliens are appealing their cases to the federal courts. The Ninth Circuit received,
on average, more than 150 appeals per week following the implementation of the
Final Rule reforms, prompting the courts to automatically issue temporary stays on
all deportation orders.205 The temporary stays, and likely remands from hastily
decided cases, threaten to defeat the very purpose of the reforms.2"4 It is not
efficient for the Board to have to hear cases repeatedly.
The Department noted that some commentators "supported the new time limits"
but did not identify whom, or provide reasons for their support.20 7  Some
commentators may have supported the time limits because they believed time limits
would lead to a faster resolution of aliens' appeals. A timely resolution of appeals
is in everyone's interest. However, remands and temporary stays will likely off-set
gains in speed. Furthermore, as the AELA noted, "[a]ccuracy and fairness in the
decision-making process are as (or more) essential than speed in determining
appeals where an individual's safety, liberty or life may be on the line."208 Finally,
the Final Rule mandates that the time limits are an "internal management directive"
and "do not affect the validity of any decision issued by the Board and do not, and
shall not be interpreted to, create any substantive or procedural rights ... ,,2" Thus,
time limits will not benefit petitioners and will only increase the likelihood of error.
Time limits on Board member decisions deprive aliens of procedural due
process by substantially increasing the risk that aliens' appeals will not be
considered fully and fairly. The Department provided no evidence that speedier
decisions will be more efficient or more cost-effective than decisions solely under
the Case Management System. Individual Board members can be expected to
competently and fairly decide cases under the Case Management System. They
cannot be expected to do so if they are not provided with enough time to review the
appeals and make informed, considered decisions. Forcing Board members to
rubber-stamp decisions to meet a time deadline undermines the integrity and
viability of the BIA as a meaningful appellate body. If Board decisions are viewed
as cursory, then appeals from BIA decisions to the federal courts and remands from
federal courts back to the BIA will undoubtedly increase, thereby undermining the
gains in efficiency achieved by other Final Rule reforms. The time limits must be
204 Getter & Peterson, supra note 194.
205 Id.
208 Id. (citing unidentified employee of the Justice Department who "expected the federal
courts to ship back to the immigration appeals board some of the hastily decided cases").
20' Board ofImmigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67
Fed. Reg. at 54,896.
208 AILA, FINAL COMMENT, supra note 26.
209 Immigration Procedural Reforms, supra note 5, at 54,904 (codified at 8 C.F.R. §
3. 1(e)(8)).
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stricken from Final Rule reforms to preserve the workability of the reforms as a
whole, and, ultimately, the legitimacy of the BIA as an appellate review body.
V. CONCLUSION: DUE PROCESS IS IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST
The Department of Justice does a disservice to United States constitutional
democracy by claiming that BIA procedural reforms are exempt from due process
requirements. In the early and middle part of the twentieth century, the
constitutional due process rights of aliens were indeed hollow.2"' In the same
breath, the Supreme Court paid lip service to the fact that the Constitution
guaranteed due process to all persons, regardless of citizenship, but upheld the
removal of aliens when they were denied even the most basic due process
protections.2"' More recent Supreme Court holdings and statutory enactments have
expanded due process protection for aliens.2"2 Under modem law, aliens' rights are
no longer categorically overborne by the government's interest in efficient
administration of immigration laws. What constitutes due process is judged by
the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test.21 4
Constitutional due process minimums should extend to procedures before the
BIA; to conclude otherwise would be to deny procedural due process to a
vulnerable group that the Constitution explicitly protects in a forum that is essential
to a fair determination of their claims. During this time, when the power of United
States is feared and resented throughout the world, the United States can ill afford
to turn away would-be visitors, residents, and citizens without affording them a fair
and full opportunity to make their cases for membership in the United States
community. Ultimately, the BIA procedural reforms must comport with
constitutional due process to be consistent with bedrock principles of American
democracy.
Breaking down the procedural reforms into their constituent parts reveals that
there are positive components of the reforms that will protect aliens' interests, while
improving efficiency for the government. The Case Management System will allow
for streamlining of BIA procedures. It assigns more resources where needed and
allows for more efficient dismissal of meritless claims that clog the appellate
210 See supra notes 40-75 and accompanying text.
21' See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (holding that an alien was afforded
due process in an exclusion proceeding despite the fact that she had no formal hearing, did
not realize she was being questioned regarding deportation, and could not understand
English).
2.. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (extending Mathews v. Eldridge due
process balancing to exclusion proceedings).
2"3 See id. (noting that aliens' rights in the proceedings were weighty and remanding the
case for a determination of whether the procedures employed comported with due process).
214 Id.
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system. The second reform, elimination of de novo factual review, will shift the
burden of accurate fact finding more squarely upon the shoulders of the immigration
judges, making the entire immigration process more efficient in the long run.
Finally, the reduction of the size of the Board will increase cohesiveness, clarity,
and predictability of the law. Reduction will also increase the efficiency and
decrease the incentive to file frivolous appeals. These reforms meet Mathews due
process analysis by effectively balancing the government's interest in BIA
efficiency with the aliens' interest in fair procedures before the Board. These
reforms promise to improve the function of the BIA.
Two components of the Final Rule reforms, however, fail to meet the
constitutional due process minimums and indeed threaten the viability of the entire
reform package. Allowing the Attorney General to have discretion over which
Board members are removed threatens the political independence and legitimacy
of the Board. It also increases the risk of erroneous deprivation of aliens' rights,
because Board members are under tremendous and perverse pressure to decide
cases hastily or risk their employment. Time limits, similarly, place unnecessary
constraints on Board members and substantially increase the risk that they will
make hurried and inaccurate decisions. Hurried and inaccurate decisions will
undermine any gains in efficiency achieved by the other reforms, and will ultimately
undercut the legitimacy of the BIA as an appellate body. As such, Attorney General
control over Board membership and time limits should be stricken from the reforms.
Limiting the BIA reforms to the Case Management System, the elimination of de
novo review, and a neutral reduction in the size of the Board will protect the long-
term viability and legitimacy of the BIA as an appellate review body.
Ultimately, it is in everyone's interest to assure that the BIA procedural reforms
conform to constitutional due process requirements. Procedural due process
protects the government against "those blunders which leave lasting stains on a
system ofjustice,"2 15 and insures that aliens are provided a full and fair opportunity
to present their cases for entering this land of freedom.
Bradley J. Wyatt
25 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1953).
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